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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL DUKE TANNER, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
Case No: 20080043-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE RELEVANCY 
STANDARD RATHER THAN GOOD CAUSE IN DENYING TANNER'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 16(A) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
The State does not address Tanner's argument that "good cause" rather than 
relevance at trial should be the determining factor in the trial court's decision on 
the motion to compel. Rather the State argues that there was no error when the 
court denied Tanner's motion to compel when the court found that the subpoenaed 
records might lead to potentially irrelevant evidence. However, the test for good 
cause as laid out by the Utah Supreme Court does not require a showing that the 
subpoenaed documents have to lead to relevant evidence, but "only a showing that 
disclosure of requested evidence in necessary to the proper preparation of the 
defense" and nsuch a showing is made whenever the trial court is appraised of the 
fact that the evidence is material to an issue to be raised at trial." State v. 
Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677, 690. 
In regards to the October 25, 2006 search, Tanner argued at the hearing on 
the motion to compel, that the credibility of the Confidential Informant is an issue 
that it intends to raise at trial. Further, Tanner argued the warrant return might 
show that the police found no evidence of a controlled substance, scales or even a 
computer desk in a search of Tanner's home after the Confidential Informant 
claims that, in a controlled buy, he purchased methamphetamine from Tanner at 
Tanner's home and that Tanner stored methamphetamine in a computer desk along 
with scales. If the return showed that the police did not find any evidence to 
substantiate the Confidential Informant's claims it might be material evidence 
regarding the Confidential Informant's credibility. (R. 297: 3-5) 
Tanner argues that this showing was sufficient to show good cause. The 
credibility of the CI is perhaps the most important issue in Tanner's case, due to 
the fact that the CI was the State's only witness to the alleged transactions. During 
sentencing the trial court noted "... the testimony from a confidential informant 
was the testimony that the jury believe [sic]; and on that testimony, they found 
Tanner guilty." (R. 298: 13) 
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At the hearing on the motion to compel, the State confused the subject by 
arguing that the return was not relevant, in that the search was authorized on 
October 18th, but the house was not searched until one week later, so the lack of 
evidence is not relevant. "From the 18th to the 25th, he could have sold the drugs, 
used the drugs, or anything else." "It's just not relevant to what was bought, the 
drugs that were purchased on the dates in question." 
However, two additional alleged buys occurred on October 19 and 24 , 
after the warrant was issued. The last alleged buy occurred less than 24 hours 
before the search was conducted. While the lack evidence substantiating the 
Confidential Informant's affidavit might not be relevant to what was bought during 
the controlled buys, it certainly is material to the Confidential Informant's 
credibility and reliability. 
The trial court then held that the warrant return was not relevant to the 
"dates in Counts IV through VIII" (R. 297: 17). Explaining its ruling the court then 
stated that 
"The fact that there was or wasn't a computer desk can be testified to 
by the CI, and any other officers that have gone through executions of search 
warrants there. 
Whether or not there were drugs in that computer desk on the 25th, 
which is after these dates, becomes irrelevant, in my estimation. Tanner 
could have used them, he could have sold them. They might not have ever 
been there, but I don't think finding - if it could be found ~ to return on the 
warrant, helps us at all with any of the issues that are relevant to this case. 
So I'm going to deny the motion to compel on that issue." (id.) 
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The court did not address Tanner's argument that the lack of evidence 
substantiating the Confidential Informant's testimony in a sworn affidavit, goes 
directly to the credibility of the CI, nor did the court explain how Tanner could 
learn of which officers were involved in the search absent the warrant return. 
The State argues in its brief that the trial court denied the motion to compel 
discovery of warrant return for two reasons. The State believes that a short 
interchange between the prosecutor and the court concerning Anderson v. Taylor 
2006 UT 79, 149 P.3d 352, rises to the level of a denial of the motion. 
At the time the October 18 warrant was issued, the Fourth District Court 
was embroiled in litigation before the Utah Supreme Court concerning the 
violation of the civil rights of those served with search warrants issued by the 
magistrates in the Fourth District. At issue was the practice of magistrates to issue 
warrants on probable cause and not keeping a copy of the affidavit, warrant or 
warrant return. (Id. at 3 5 6-3 5 7)While the Utah Supreme Court decided the issue 
on a statutory basis and did not reach the constitutional issues, the Supreme Court 
concluded "that the practice followed by the Fourth District Court is sufficiently 
troubling to warrant the imposition of this court's [Supreme Court] 'inherent 
supervisory authority over all court of this state.'" (Id. at 357.) 
The next sentence warns of the potential abuse of the Fourth District's 
practice. "The policy of the Fourth District Court is sound only if we may 
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confidently assume that law enforcement always acts with complete honesty, 
integrity, and competence. Unfortunately, it is much more likely that even the 
most honest and well-intentioned officer will occasionally make mistakes in 
handling, preserving, and filing the warrant documents. Were it not so, there 
would be no need for a warrant requirement at all. (Id. at 358.) 
Exposing Tanner, who was facing 5 First Degree Felony Counts, to the exact 
harm that the Supreme Court warned of in Anderson, the State, in its brief argues: 
"The prosecutor also explained that he had tried, but failed, to locate the warrant 
return" pointing to the Record R297:16. The record on line 20 of that page through 
line 5 of the following page gives us the exact interchange which the State claims 
is the trial court's alternative basis for denying the motion. 
The court: "Frankly, the real question is whether anybody can find a copy of 
the return on the warrant, since I think - 1 can't remember when the 
Anderson case came - case came down, and when it was we [the court] 
started keeping all of these things down in the clerk of the court's office. 
Prosecutor: "It was after this. We've tried to locate it." 
The Court: "That's what I thought. So I'm not sure the Court has one. If you 
haven't found it here, I don't know that we can find it either, because in 
those days there wasn't an organized way of doing it. 
At any rate, I am not persuaded that the return on the warrant is 
relevant to the dates in Counts IV through VIII, which are now set for trial." 
(R: 16-17.) 
Although Tanner has not made an accusation of prosecutorial misconduct in 
this appeal over the missing warrant return, the State argues that the prosecutor had 
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no knowledge of the return and therefore was not responsible for disclosure. 
(Appellant's Brief page 12.) The State correctly points out that the prosecutor has 
a duty to disclose upon request only those materials of which he has knowledge. 
Further, the knowledge of the prosecutor's staff and the investigating police 
officers is imputed to the prosecutor. 
The trial court determined that a piece a misplaced warrant return was 
irrelevant to Tanner's case without having seen it. Further, the court made no 
substantive inquiry into who was involved in looking for the return, how extensive 
the search was, or how the warrant return came to go missing in the first place. If 
the trial court had actually explored the issue with the required diligence needed to 
actually deny the motion to compel based on the fact that the warrant return was 
missing, evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, which in and of itself is mitigating, 
might have surfaced. 
Affirming on the basis of the State's argument of 'oops, we can't find it5 
without requiring a substantive inquiry by the trial court into how critical evidence 
like a warrant return was lost, would allow a less honest and less well-intentioned 
officer to make "mistakes" affecting Tanner's critical liberty interests in handling 
and preserving exculpatory evidence, opening the door to potentially dangerous 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
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Frankly, despite the State's argument, the trial court never came to the 
conclusion that the materials could not be found and that the prosecutor, 
prosecutor's staff and law enforcement had no knowledge of the return. In fact it 
assumed that at the very least the investigating officer had knowledge of the return 
when the court suggested that defense counsel could cross examine officers 
involved in the search. (R. 297: 17.) The court simply held that the evidence was 
irrelevant to the "dates in Counts IV through VIII, which are now set for trial. (Id.) 
The State makes the claim that".. .nothing in the record shows that Arthur 
Allred, the CI who conducted the controlled buys, provided any information to 
support the warrant executed on October, 25, 2006." (Appellant's Brief page 13.) 
The prosecutor clearly stated in his opening argument that "the police 
officers investigated that, arranged to have somebody else who - his name's Arthur 
Allred. You will hear him referred to as a CI or a confidential informant... We 
arranged for him to go in and purchase drugs from Mr. Tanner on a couple of 
different occasions, and those are the days we're here for." (R. 288: 54.) This 
intorduction completely consistent with the description of the Confidential 
Informant relied upon in Sgt. Mark Troxel's affidavit (R. 191, 190) Further, 
defense counsel identified Arthur Allred as the CI who provided the information 
for the affidavit (R: 180) without any rebuttal by the State anywhere in the record. 
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Based on Sgt. TroxePs probable cause affidavit for the October 18, 2006 
search warrant (executed on October 25th) it became apparent that Sgt. Troxel had 
been involved in previous searches of Tanner's residence. (R: 191) Accordingly, 
Tanner moved to compel the production of all probable cause affidavits, and 
warrant returns on all searches between January 2006 and January 2007. Tanner 
argued that the fact that Tanner had not been charged from any of these searches, 
might mean that the police never found illegal drugs at his home and defense 
counsel argued that if the searches yielded no evidence these executed search 
warrants might be exculpatory or mitigating in nature. Further, the lack of 
evidence might show that the CI was less than reliable. 
Although the State did not admit that the searches yielded nothing before or 
during trial, at sentencing, Sgt. Troxel stated to the court that he and other officers 
had been seeking evidence against Tanner for nearly a decade. (R: 298: 6) 
The Court noted that: "As I look at his history, from '96 on, I've got 
disturbing the peace, I've got driving without registration, I've got 
possession of paraphernalia... that's up to 2000. In 2002, Fve got a simple 
assault. Finally in 2004, we have an attempted possession or use of 
controlled substance, and a possession of paraphernalia, both Class A's." 
The court then asked: Now I have, finally, in 2007, these felonies. So, why 
haven't there been felonies all along the way? If he's done everything 
you're telling me he's done...? (Id. at 8.) 
Sgt. Troxel, in response to the court's questioning, responded: "... During 
those searches that I have been involved in previously, quantities of drugs were not 
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found, so the charges could be brought; but the search warrants were still 
completed...." (Id.) 
Evidence that the police officer who was to testify at Tanner's trial had been 
pursuing Tanner for a decade without recovering any quantity of drugs resulting in 
any charges, despite repeated searches might have had a mitigating effect in the 
mind of the jury. Especially if the jury learned that in a search executed less than 
24 hours after an alleged transaction Tanner was on trial for, a search of Tanner's 
residence occurred and no drugs were found. (The October 25th warrant return 
would show the timing of the search, which might be substantially less than 24 
hours after the last alleged transaction occurred.) 
It is possible that if the court had not denied the motion to compel the 
discovery of all probable cause affidavits and warrant returns, Tanner might have 
been able to show a pattern of unreliable Confidential Informants, which is 
particularly important in this case where the CI had already been arrested for and 
admitted to prescription and credit card fraud. (R. 288: 126.) 
The affidavits and search warrant returns sought by Tanner were important 
to the preparation of the defense and Tanner apprised the trial court of the fact that 
the evidence was material to the issue of the credibility of the one and only State's 
witness to the all five of the First Degree Felony Counts Tanner faced at this trial. 
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Despite Tanner's showing of good cause, the trial court applied a relevance 
standard to the evidence sought rather than the required good cause standard. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Tanner requests this Court to reverse his conviction and remand it to the Fourth 
District Court for new proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this $ day of October, 2010 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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